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MAKING CIVIL RICO "SUAVE": CONGRESS
MUST ACT TO ENSURE CONSISTENT JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RACKETEER




In 1970, Congress passed Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act, otherwise known as the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).' RICO arose out of
increasing concerns over the influence of organized crime on
the American economy,2 which it sought to eliminate through
criminal sanctions and civil remedies.3 The civil remedy
provision of RICO4 was intended to discourage criminal
activity by providing injured persons with an incentive to sue
those who engaged in statutorily sanctioned conduct.'
In August of 2005, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
* Editor-in-Chief, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 47; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law; B.A., History, University of California,
Berkeley. The author wishes to thank Natalie Kwan for her seemingly
unlimited support and patience.
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, §§ 901-
902, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (1971) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
2. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, § 1, 84 Stat. at 922 (Congressional
Statement of Findings and Purpose) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006)). In
passing the law, Congress noted that organized crime "annually drains billions
of dollars from America's economy" and "weaken[s] the stability of the Nation's
economic system." Id.
3. Michael Goldsmith & Mark Jay Linderman, Civil RICO Reform: The
Gatekeeper Concept, 43 VAND. L. REV. 735, 737 (1990).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). The phrases "civil RICO,"
"§ 1964(c)," and "civil remedy provision" are used interchangeably throughout
this comment to refer to the civil RICO provision contained in 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c).
5. See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 3, at 738.
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issued a decision granting standing under RICO's civil
remedy provision to plaintiff David Diaz in Diaz v. Gates.6
Diaz alleged that the defendants, the Los Angeles Police
Department and employees of the City of Los Angeles, falsely
imprisoned him and caused him to lose employment and
employment opportunities.7 The Ninth Circuit's decision ran
contrary to prior decisions by the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits, both of which held that RICO's civil remedy
provision did not permit the recovery of damages related to
pecuniary losses resulting from personal injuries.'
The split between the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits highlights the need for Congress to re-
evaluate the civil RICO provision. RICO is "an ill-defined
statute,"9 and courts have thus struggled to ascertain
Congress' intent in enacting it.' ° Concerned by what they
viewed as inappropriate uses of civil RICO, some federal
courts imposed standing restrictions upon civil RICO claims11
in an attempt to curtail plaintiffs' reliance upon the statute.12
Such action, however, directly conflicts with congressional 3
and Supreme Court 14 mandates stating that RICO should be
interpreted liberally.
Section II of this comment explores the mechanics and
purposes behind the RICO statute. 5 It then traces the
events 6 leading up to the Supreme Court's decision in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 7 before detailing subsequent
attempts by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits to limit civil
6. See Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
7. Id. at 897.
8. Id. at 908 (Gould, J., dissenting); see also Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 767
(7th Cir. 1992); Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 848 (1lth Cir. 1988).
9. Eric W. McNeil, Comment, Civil RICO Standing: Direct/Indirect
Distinction Should Not Be Taken Sitting Down, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1239, 1240
(1990).
10. See David Kurzweil, Article, Criminal and Civil RICO: Traditional
Canons of Statutory Interpretation and the Liberal Construction Clause, 30
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 41, 56-57 (1996).
11. McNeil, supra note 9, at 1242-43.
12. Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 3, at 736.
13. See discussion infra Part II.A.
14. See discussion infra Part II.B.
15. See discussion infra Part II.A.
16. See discussion infra Part II.B.
17. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); see also discussion
infra Part II.D.
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RICO's scope.'" Section II concludes with an examination of
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Diaz, which rejected the
restrictions set forth by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. 9
Section III identifies the legal problem embodied in the split
between the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits.2 °  Section IV analyzes the RICO statute and
critiques its construction before scrutinizing the conflicting
approaches of the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits in interpreting civil RICO. 2' Section V
proposes that Congress amend RICO to eradicate the
statute's inherent ambiguity and promote uniformity within
the judiciary.22  Finally, Section VI concludes that the
judiciary will continue to experience difficulties in
effectuating the civil RICO provision until Congress
rehabilitates the statute through the legislative process.23
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Mechanics of RICO
Prior to RICO's enactment, members of Congress
expressed concern that organized crime had shifted its
emphasis from its traditional revenue-generating enterprises,
such as gambling and prostitution, to legitimate business
activities.24 Thus, in enacting RICO, Congress hoped to
"eradicat[e] . . . organized crime in the United States by
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering
process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by
providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with
the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime."25
RICO focuses on punishing either the investment of
criminal profits in a legitimate enterprise, or the acquisition
of an interest in such an enterprise by extortion or fraud.26 It
18. See discussion infra Part II.C.
19. See discussion infra Part II.D.
20. See discussion infra Part III.
21. See discussion infra Part IV.
22. See discussion infra Part V.
23. See discussion infra Part VI.
24. Robert K. Rasmussen, Introductory Remarks and a Comment on Civil
RICO's Remedial Provisions, 43 VAND. L. REV. 623, 624 (1990).
25. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84
Stat. 922, 923 (1971).
26. Gerard E. Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical, and Political Guide to RICO
2007] 125
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does so, as outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 1962,27 by prohibiting: (1)
the use of money obtained through a "pattern of racketeering
activity" in acquiring or managing any "enterprise "28 engaged
in interstate commerce;29 (2) acquiring such an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity;3" (3) operating
such an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity;3' and (4) conspiring to carry out any of these
activities.3 2  As characterized by 18 U.S.C. § 1961, 3 which
defines many of the terms central to the RICO statute,34 the
phrase "pattern of racketeering activity" consists of the
commission of at least two acts of racketeering activity that
occurred within ten years of one another. Further, § 1961
lists an expansive array of offenses that comprise
"racketeering activity."36  The acts contained within the
definition of racketeering activity are often referred to as
"predicate acts."37 Many of these predicate acts are state law
crimes.38
The prohibitions of § 1962 are complemented by
significant criminal punishments for RICO violations39 in 18
U.S.C. § 1963.40 Violators of § 1962 face penalties as severe
as life imprisonment depending upon the severity of the
predicate acts committed.4 Furthermore, § 1963 authorizes
Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 769, 770 (1990).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
28. An "enterprise" constitutes "any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity" for the purposes of RICO. Id. §
1961(4) (2000).
29. Id. § 1962(a).
30. Id. § 1962(b).
31. Id. § 1962(c).
32. Id. § 1962(d).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000).
34. See generally id.
35. Id. § 1961(5).
36. Id. § 1961(1). These offenses can be divided into three categories: state
law crimes that are punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,
violations of the United States Code, and offenses involving bankruptcy fraud,
security fraud, and drug dealing. Rasmussen, supra note 24, at 625-26
(summarizing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)). One writer remarked that the extensive
definition of "racketeering activity" was made necessary by the mob's
willingness to try anything to make a profit. See Lynch, supra note 26, at 773.
37. McNeil, supra note 9, at 1242.
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
39. See Rasmussen, supra note 24, at 626.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1963.
41. Id. § 1963(a).
126 [Vol: 47
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the forfeiture of: (1) any interest the defendant obtained by
committing a RICO violation;42 (2) any interest in an
enterprise established or operated in violation of RICO;43 and
(3) any proceeds the defendant acquired by committing a
RICO violation. 4
In addition to strong criminal penalties,4" RICO also
contains a civil remedy to enforce its basic principles. The
civil remedy provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), provides that
"[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of
a violation of section 1962 . . .may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover
threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee ... ."46 Thus, a plaintiff
must demonstrate an injury to her business or property
resulting from a racketeering activity as defined in § 1962 in
order to have standing under civil RICO.47 Furthermore,
Congress expressed its desire that the provisions of RICO be
interpreted broadly by including a liberal construction clause
in the statute, stating that "[t]he provisions of [RICO] shall be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."48
Congress modeled RICO's civil remedy provision after
federal antitrust laws,49  which proved to be effective
deterrents of criminal conduct.5 °  Acting under the
presumption that criminal penalties alone would not
42. Id. § 1963(a)(1).
43. Id. § 1963(a)(2).
44. Id. § 1963(a)(3).
45. Though the sentencing provisions are stern, the forfeiture provision may
be the "true force of the criminal penalties" of RICO. See Rasmussen, supra
note 24, at 627.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
47. See Steven P. Ragland, Comment, Using the Master's Tools: Fighting
Persistent Police Misconduct with Civil RICO, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 139, 149 (2001)
(construing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).
48. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 922, 947 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1968 (2000)).
49. Kurzweil, supra note 10, at 60. The antitrust legislation after which the
civil RICO provision is modeled is section 4 of the Clayton Act. Id. (citing 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1994)). Section 4 of the Clayton Act allows private parties injured
by actions forbidden by the antitrust laws to file lawsuits against the parties
causing their injuries. See 15 U.S.C. § 15.
50. Stephen Scallan, Proximate Cause Under RICO, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 455,
455 (1996). Some 22,585 antitrust suits were filed between 1960 and 1980, 84
percent of which were filed by private plaintiffs. Id. at 455 n.5 (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 91-1549, at 55-60 (2d Sess. 1970); H.R. REP. No. 91-617, at 81 (1st Sess.
1969)).
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significantly diminish organized criminal activity,5' Congress
created the civil remedy in order to induce individual
plaintiffs to act as private attorneys general who would
enforce RICO's prohibitions in civil lawsuits.52  RICO
proponents believed that the civil remedy's lower burden of
proof relative to criminal cases, 3 as well as its advantageous
venue5 4 and civil investigative demand55 provisions, would
entice plaintiffs to file suit under civil RICO. 6 Additionally,
the inclusion of a civil remedy provided victims of organized
criminal activity with a legal remedy.57
Though Congress intended to target organized crime by
passing RICO, the text of the statute does not explicitly
mention it. 58  RICO drafters were concerned that such a
specific reference could induce constitutional scrutiny,5 9 and
noted the practical difficulties in creating a statute so narrow
that it did not also encompass offenses committed by persons
outside of organized crime.6 °
Civil RICO supporters note that the statute has proven
successful in enabling plaintiffs to bring civil actions against
persons involved in criminal activity.61 Further, some counter
51. McNeil, supra note 9, at 1240.
52. See id.; see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 493
(1985) ("Private attorney general provisions such as § 1964(c) are in part
designed to fill prosecutorial gaps.").
53. John L. Koenig, Comment, What Have They Done to Civil RICO: The
Supreme Court Takes the Racketeering Requirement Out of Racketeering, 35 AM.
U.L. REV. 821, 833 (1986).
54. Section 1965 provides for nationwide venue and service of process in
RICO lawsuits. See 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (2000).
55. Section 1968 enables the Attorney General to issue civil investigative
demands. Id. § 1968.
56. See Koenig, supra note 53, at 833.
57. Kurzweil, supra note 10, at 60-61.
58. Michael Rowan, Comment, Leaving No Stone Unturned: Using RICO as
a Remedy for Police Misconduct, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 231, 240 (2003); see also
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
59. Rowan, supra note 58, at 240. Some were concerned that a specific
reference to organized crime in the text of the statute could be misinterpreted
as creating a status crime, or as targeting an ethnic group, thereby inviting a
constitutional challenge. See id.
60. Kurzweil, supra note 10, at 58-59. Senator McClellan, who sponsored
RICO, noted that "[it is impossible to draw an effective statute which reaches
most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not include
offenses commonly committed by persons outside of organized crime as well."
116 CONG. REC. 18, 940 (daily ed. June 9, 1970) (statement of Sen. McCellan).
61. Susan Getzendanner, Judicial "Pruning" of "Garden Variety Fraud"
Civil RICO Cases Does Not Work: It's Time for Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REV.
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criticisms of the statute's broad reach by maintaining that the
serious nature of the conduct that RICO was implemented to
combat justifies civil RICO's breadth and lucrative
remedies.62 In addition, advocates point to the dismissal
process as an effective safeguard against the potential for
frivolous claims created by the statute's breadth.63
Furthermore, lobbyists argue that RICO provides consumers
with protection against corrupt corporate entities.64
Critics maintain that civil RICO is inherently flawed.
Opponents in Congress believed that the statute would be
prone to abuse and could result in the harassment of
legitimate businesses by unscrupulous competitors. 65 Former
Chief Justice William Rehnquist echoed a common criticism
when he noted that plaintiffs used the civil RICO provision in
ways Congress never intended, as the majority of cases
brought under the statute did not involve organized crime.66
Critics also contend that civil RICO claims violate principles
of federalism by converting areas of state law into federal
matters,67 and that the complicated issues involved in a RICO
case burden an already overloaded federal judiciary.68
Additionally, some question whether civil lawsuits effectively
deter crime.69
B. The Rise of Civil RICO and Judicial Attempts to Curtail It
Initially, plaintiffs rarely brought claims under civil
RICO.7 °  In fact, courts published only two decisions
673, 674 (1990).
62. See Lynch, supra note 26, at 793 ("And if extraordinary remedies such
as treble damages and attorney's fees are ever appropriate, would they not be
particularly appropriate in cases in which the defendant had committed not
merely a civil wrong, but a 'pattern of racketeering acts?'").
63. See id. at 796-97.
64. Richard Corrigan, Rolling Back RICO, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 6, 1986, at 2114.
65. Kurzweil, supra note 10, at 61.
66. William J. Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much Is Needed?, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 639, 644-45 (1990) (quoting William Rehnquist, Reforming Diversity
Jurisdiction and Civil RICO, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 5, 9 (1989)).
67. Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 3, at 747.
68. Lynch, supra note 26, at 796.
69. Id. at 793 ("If the Godfather threatens to break your legs if you fail to
pay your debts to a loanshark, it seems unlikely that your immediate response
is to file a lawsuit.").
70. See Koenig, supra note 53, at 823 n.11 (citing Louis C. Long, Treble
Damages for Violations of the Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis and
Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REV. 201, 206 n.32
2007] 129
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regarding private civil RICO cases between 1970 and 1977. 7'
However, the number of civil RICO actions proliferated
considerably starting in 1978.72 The increase in the number
of civil RICO cases can largely be explained by the
convergence of several factors.
To begin with, RICO is an extremely broad statute.73 The
extensive coverage of § 1962 is drawn from the expansive
definitions of the terms "pattern of racketeering activity"74
and "enterprise"7 5 contained in § 1961.76 Additionally, given
the wide range of activities that qualify as "racketeering
activity, '77 and the fact that two such activities within a ten
year span constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity,"8
plaintiffs usually do not encounter significant difficulties in
alleging and proving such conduct.7 9
In addition, the advantages gained by a plaintiff filing a
civil RICO claim lead to what one writer deemed "theory
shopping.""°  The majority of civil RICO claims involve
ordinary commercial disputes that could be brought under
state law.81  However, attorneys are often able to re-
characterize these claims to conform to the requirements of
RICO. 2 The primary motivation for such action is the
prospect of receiving the treble damages and attorney's fees
awarded to a victorious plaintiff.3 In addition, federal courts
(1981)).
71. Id.
72. Id. Between 1978 and 1990, over 100 civil RICO decisions were
published. Francis J. Flaherty, A RICO Crisis; 2d Circuit Rulings Sharply Curb
Civil Actions: Lawyers See Confusion Until High Court Acts, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
13, 1984, at 30.
73. Rasmussen, supra note 24, at 626.
74. See supra text accompanying note 35.
75. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. As one writer noted, "[iut is
difficult to think of a way Congress could have defined 'enterprise' in a broader
fashion." Rasmussen, supra note 24, at 625.
76. Rasmussen, supra note 24, at 624 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2005)).
77. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
78. See supra text accompanying note 35.
79. Norman Abrams, A New Proposal For Limiting Private Civil RICO, 37
UCLA L. REV. 1, 9 (1989).
80. Rasmussen, supra note 24, at 636.
81. Id.
82. Getzendanner, supra note 61, at 674. "Once a clever lawyer can
characterize an opponent's actions as constituting [a pattern of racketeering
activity], it takes little imagination to deem those actions RICO violations."
Rasmussen, supra note 24, at 626.
83. Rasmussen, supra note 24, at 636.
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have jurisdiction over civil RICO claims, 4 allowing plaintiffs
to bypass the less efficient state courts.8 5 Finally, framing a
lawsuit as a civil RICO claim gives the plaintiff leverage in
pressuring the defendant to settle s.8  The substantial benefits
available to the plaintiff have led some to remark that it is
"virtually malpractice" not to add a civil RICO claim to a
complaint when possible. 7
As the number of civil RICO claims increased, some
federal district courts expressed concern over what they
believed to be inappropriate uses of civil RICO in suits
regarding commonplace business disputes.88  These courts
were reluctant to interpret civil RICO broadly,8 9 despite the
instruction of the liberal construction clause,9" and imposed
standing limitations on civil RICO claims in an attempt to
curb the rising number of lawsuits brought under the
statute.91  Such limitations included an organized crime
requirement 92 and a competitive injury requirement,93 both of
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
85. Lynch, supra note 26, at 794. Lawyers in many parts of the country
generally prefer to litigate in federal court due to the smaller caseloads, the
enhanced reputations of the judges, and the modern rules of procedure. Id.
86. See id. ("[Firaming the suit as a RICO claim labels the defendant a
racketeer-terminology that increases the settlement pressure on defendants
worried about the reputational damage of extended and possibly unsuccessful
defense of a lawsuit."); see also Rasmussen, supra note 24, at 636 (stating that
the prospect of treble damages and attorney's fees gives the plaintiff an
advantage in settlement negotiations).
87. Lynch, supra note 26, at 794.
88. See McNeil, supra note 9, at 1242; see also Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc.,
553 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983); Van
Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D. Mass.
1982); N. Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
89. Kurzweil, supra note 10, at 71. One district court judge wrote in an
opinion, "I do not disagree with plaintiffs argument that the congressional
intent when enacting this statute was that it be broadly construed, however...
section 1964(c) must be interpreted with careful attention to the provision's
purposes and [courts must] 'avoid[] a slavish literalism that would escort into
federal court through RICO what traditionally have been civil actions in state
courts."' Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210, 217-18 (D. Colo. 1983)).
90. Kurzweil, supra note 10, at 62.
91. Koenig, supra note 53, at 833.
92. In order to withstand summary judgment, plaintiffs were required to
allege that the defendants were linked to organized crime. Goldsmith &
Linderman, supra note 3, at 736 n.2 (citing Plains Res., Inc. v. Gable, 782 F.2d
883, 887 (10th Cir. 1986); Owl Constr. Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc.,
727 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1984)).
93. The competitive injury requirement mandated that a plaintiff prove that
132 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 47
which were soon rejected by courts.94
Not all attempts to restrict the number of civil RICO
claims were so quickly brushed aside. The two most
significant and widely utilized methods of limiting the scope
of civil RICO used by the circuit courts were the prior
conviction and the racketeering injury requirements. 95 The
prior conviction requirement mandated that the defendant be
convicted of two or more predicate acts96 before civil relief
could be granted. The racketeering injury requirement was
not so clear-cut. 98  In the circuits that imposed this
requirement, plaintiffs were required to demonstrate
"something more than an injury flowing from the predicate
acts of racketeering.., to sustain a civil RICO action."99 For
example, "a racketeering injury would be the loss of a
business through bankruptcy, caused by the predicate acts of
mail fraud and extortion." 100
The United States Supreme Court, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co.,' 1 rejected the prior conviction and racketeering
injury requirements in a 5-4 decision.0 2 Sedima, a Belgian
corporation, contracted with Imrex, an aviation product
her injury resulted from competing with an enterprise that "obtained an unfair
advantage through racketeering activity." Id. This requirement came into
existence when the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois noted that
Congress based civil RICO's provisions on antitrust laws, and thus determined
that civil RICO plaintiffs, like plaintiffs suing under antitrust laws, were
required to allege a competitive injury. Terrence P. Canade, Article, Civil
RICO-Incentive to Litigate: The Court's Rejection of Standing Requirements:
Sedima v. Imrex, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985), 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1086,
1090 (1985) (construing Fanslow, 547 F. Supp at 211); see also, Bankers Trust
Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd on other
grounds sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984);
Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. at 211.
94. See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 3, at 736 n.2. The organized
crime limitation was rejected because neither RICO's text nor its legislative
history supported it. Id. (citing Plains Res., 782 F.2d at 887; Owl Constr. Co.,
727 F.2d at 542). The competitive injury requirement was rejected when courts
distinguished the purposes behind antitrust laws and civil RICO. Canade,
supra note 93, at 1091.
95. Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 3, at 736 n.2.
96. See supra text accompanying note 37.
97. Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 3, at 736 n.2 (construing Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985)).
98. See id.
99. McNeil, supra note 9, at 1243.
100. Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 3, at 736 n.2.
101. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
102. Id. at 480.
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provider, to supply a NATO subcontractor with component
parts.10 3  Sedima filed suit in the District Court for the
Eastern District of New York when it became suspicious that
Imrex was conducting its affairs so as to deny Sedima its
portion of the proceeds from the agreement. 10 4
The district court dismissed the civil RICO charges
against Imrex based on Sedima's failure to allege an injury
other than that directly resulting from the predicate acts.1°5
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the racketeering
injury requirement, 10 6 and attempted to clarify the district
court's decision by stating that a racketeering injury was
"different in kind from that occurring as a result of the
predicate acts themselves, or not simply caused by the
predicate acts, but also caused by an activity which RICO was
designed to deter."'017 In addition, the court of appeals,
believing that Congress did not intend for civil defendants to
be discredited as criminals without being previously
convicted, held that a prior conviction for the predicate acts
was required for civil RICO proceedings.'
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's
decision.'019 In rejecting the prior conviction requirement, the
majority noted that the word "conviction" did not appear in
any relevant portion of the RICO statute,110 and maintained
that the statute's requirement of a "violation" of § 1962 did
not imply a criminal conviction requirement."' The Court
derided the vagueness of the Second Circuit's logic in
applying the racketeering injury requirement constraint, 112
stating that "the compensable injury necessarily is the harm
caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a
103. Canade, supra note 93, at 1088.
104. Id. Sedima alleged that Imrex overstated purchase prices and various
other costs and charges on invoices, purchase orders and credit memoranda.
Koenig, supra note 53, at 840.
105. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1983),
affd, 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
106. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc.,741 F.2d 482, 503-04 (2d Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
107. Id. at 496.
108. Id. at 499-502.
109. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985).
110. Id. at 488.
111. Id. at 489.
112. Id. at 495 ("There is no room in the statutory language for an additional,
amorphous 'racketeering injury' requirement.").
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pattern .. ."113 In effect, the Court held that a civil RICO
plaintiff did not need to allege any injury apart from that
suffered on account of the predicate acts. 114
The Court justified its less restrictive interpretation of
civil RICO by emphasizing the liberal construction clause:
"I]f Congress' liberal-construction mandate is to be applied
anywhere, it is in § 1964, where RICO's remedial purposes
are most evident."" 5  The Court feared that the Second
Circuit's standing restrictions would prevent civil RICO
claims from being brought, rather than effectuate the broad
purposes Congress had in mind when enacting the statute.116
While sharing the Second Circuit's concern that civil
RICO was being used in ways not likely envisioned by
Congress," 7 the Court asserted that Congress, not the
judiciary, was the proper forum in which to remedy any
defects in the statute."8 Moreover, the Court stated that the
fact that RICO had been applied in ways not anticipated by
Congress merely demonstrated the breadth of the statute, not
necessarily its misuse." 9
Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Powell, in which he
maintained that the statute allowed recovery for an injury
from a pattern of racketeering activity, and not from the mere
commission of a predicate act. 120 In his estimation, RICO was
designed to provide a previously unavailable remedy to
injured businesspersons;"'. therefore, the statute should have
been interpreted narrowly to prevent plaintiffs from
113. Id. at 497.
114. Id. at 495.
115. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491 n.10.
116. See id. at 498-99.
117. Id. at 500 ("We nonetheless recognize that, in its private civil version,
RICO is evolving into something quite different from the original conception of
its enactors.").
118. Id. at 499-500 ("Yet this defect-if defect it is-is inherent in the statute
as written, and its correction must lie with Congress. It is not for the judiciary
to eliminate the private action in situations where Congress has provided it
simply because plaintiffs are not taking advantage of it in its more difficult
applications.").
119. See id. at 499 (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) ("[Tjhe fact
that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress
... demonstrates breadth.")).
120. See id. at 509-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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recovering damages in federal courts when state law
remedies were available to them.'22 Justice Marshall believed
that the majority's decision "revolutionize [d] private
litigation" by validating the federalization of state claims,
displacing federal remedies,'23 and providing plaintiffs with
an incentive to invoke civil RICO whenever possible on
account of the possibility of winning treble damages.124
C. Post-Sedima Attempts to Limit Civil RICO Standing
Despite the Supreme Court's directive to interpret civil
RICO broadly in compliance with the liberal construction
clause, the judiciary continued to attempt to retract the scope
of the statute. 25  Courts turned their attention to the
requirement contained in § 1964(c) that a plaintiff must
suffer injury to her business or property in order to recover
damages as a means of limiting standing under civil RICO.
126
1. The Eleventh Circuit: Grogan v. Platt 127
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this
matter in Grogan v. Platt. Grogan concerned a civil RICO
suit filed by FBI agents and the estates of deceased FBI
agents after six were wounded and two killed in a gunfight
against the defendants, who committed extortion, robbery,
and attempted murder in a scheme to steal large sums of
money. 128  The plaintiffs argued that persons killed or
physically injured by RICO predicate acts suffered economic
consequences that constituted injuries to business or
property. 29
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, and held that civil RICO
excluded recovery for personal injuries, including the
resulting pecuniary losses, because the requirement of an
injury to business or property implied a proprietary type of
122. See id. at 501-04.
123. Id. at 501.
124. Id. at 504.
125. G. Robert Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO:
Reflections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be
Effective Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 580
(1987).
126. Kurzweil, supra note 10, at 76.
127. Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844 (11th Cir. 1988).
128. Id. at 845.
129. Id. at 846.
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damage. 130 In the opinion of the court, the words "business or
property" contained within § 1964(c) acted as words of
limitation that restricted the types of injuries that persons
harmed by predicate acts could recover damages for.13' Also,
while the court held open the possibility of plaintiffs
recovering damages for the loss of employment opportunities
under civil RICO, it affirmed that pecuniary losses best
understood as part of a personal injury claim were not
recoverable under civil RICO. 1
32
2. The Seventh Circuit: Doe v. Roe 133
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals set forth its
interpretation of the injury to business or property
requirement in Doe v. Roe. The plaintiff brought a civil RICO
suit alleging that her divorce attorney defrauded her into
having sexual relations with him in lieu of payment for his
services. 134 The Seventh Circuit denied her standing because
she failed to allege a business or property injury within the
meaning of § 1964(c). 13
The court initiated its analysis by stating that the words
"business or property" as stated in civil RICO were "words of
limitation which preclude recovery for personal injuries and
the pecuniary losses incurred therefrom."' 36 Noting that the
question of whether a particular interest amounted to
property was one of state law, 37 the court struck down the
plaintiffs claim that her sexual favors to the defendant had
an intrinsic value commensurate with a property interest,
since sexual labor had no legal value in Illinois. 31 In
addition, the plaintiff attempted to recover financial losses
incurred as a result of her relationship with the defendant,
including loss of earnings, and fees stemming from her
employment of a new attorney. 39 The court also rejected this
claim, holding that these expenditures were derivatives of the
130. Id. at 847.
131. Id. at 846.
132. Id. at 848.
133. Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1992).
134. Id. at 765.
135. Id. at 770.
136. Id. at 767.
137. Id. at 768.
138. Id.
139. Doe, 958 F.2d at 769-70.
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plaintiffs emotional distress, and therefore, constituted
personal injuries not compensable under RICO. 4 '
D. The Ninth Circuit Adopts a New Approach in Diaz v.
Gates'
The Ninth Circuit confronted the injury to business or
property requirement in Diaz v. Gates. The plaintiff, David
Diaz, was convicted of attempted murder, among other
crimes, in 1999.142 Diaz claimed that he was falsely
imprisoned as a result of the "Rampart scandal," 43 which
rocked the Los Angeles Police Department in 1999.1'4
Consequently, he initiated a civil RICO claim against two
hundred people affiliated with either the Los Angeles Police
Department or the Los Angeles city government. 145  Diaz
alleged that officers fabricated evidence and conspired to
secure a false conviction against him.146  As a result, he
claimed to have lost "employment, employment opportunities,
and the wages and other compensation associated with said
business, employment and opportunities, in that [he] was
rendered unable to pursue gainful employment ....
The defendants moved to dismiss Diaz's claim, arguing
that he lacked standing because he did not allege an injury to
business or property as required by § 1964(c). 14  The district
140. Id. at 770.
141. Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
142. Id. at 907 n.1 (Gould, J., dissenting). Diaz was also convicted of
aggravated mayhem, assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, and
assault with a semiautomatic weapon, with enhancements for discharging a
firearm causing great bodily injury, firearm use and infliction of great bodily
injury. Id.
143. Id. at 898 (majority opinion). The "Rampart scandal" refers to a pattern
of systematic misconduct on the part of officers in the Los Angeles Police
Department's Rampart Division. Ragland, supra note 47, at 142-43. Rampart
officers allegedly stole illegal narcotics from police storage, planted evidence,
framed suspects, and committed perjury to conceal their scheme. Id. at 142.
Approximately seventy police officers were implicated for their involvement,
and over one hundred sentences were overturned after news of the scandal
broke. Rowan, supra note 58, at 234 (citing Frontline: LAPD Blues (PBS
television broadcast May 15, 2001) (transcript), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbhlpages/frontline/shows/lapd/etc/script.html (last visited
Oct. 13, 2006)).
144. Ragland, supra note 47, at 142.
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court granted the defendants' motion, and dismissed Diaz's
action without prejudice and with leave to amend.'49 The
district judge later dismissed the complaint with prejudice
when Diaz failed to amend it. 5 ° A divided panel of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the district
court's dismissal' before the judges agreed to rehear the case
en banc.
152
1. The Majority Opinion
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's dismissal, holding that Diaz properly alleged an injury
to business or property within the meaning of civil RICO.'53
The court of appeals noted the district court's reliance on
Oscar v. University Students Co-Operative Ass'n,5 which
held that RICO only provided a cause of action for injuries to
property interests resulting in concrete financial losses,' 5 and
that personal injuries did not constitute injuries to business
or property. 56 Oscar, however, was clarified by Mendoza v.
Zirkle Fruit Co., ' which the Ninth Circuit decided one
month after the district court dismissed Diaz's claim.15 8  In
Mendoza, a class of agricultural workers claimed that their
employers illegally suppressed their wages by hiring
undocumented workers at below-market rates.159 There, the
circuit court held that the workers alleged a sufficient injury
to a property interest to obtain standing under RICO-the
"legal entitlement to business relations unhampered by
schemes prohibited by the RICO predicate statutes." 60 Diaz,
the Ninth Circuit opined, alleged the same injury as the
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Diaz v. Gates, 380 F.3d 480 (9th Cir. 2004).
152. Diaz v. Gates, 389 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2004).
153. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 902-03.
154. Oscar v. Univ. Students Coop. Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1992).
Oscar involved tenants in an apartment building who alleged that they lost
their rental interest in their apartment as a result of racketeering activity,
including drug dealing and violence, occurring in a neighboring building. See
id. at 784-85.
155. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 898 (construing Oscar, 965 F.2d at 785).
156. Id. at 898-99 (construing Oscar, 965 F.2d at 787).
157. Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002).
158. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 899.
159. Id. (construing Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1166).
160. Id. (quoting Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1168 n.4).
138 [Vol: 47
MAKING CIVIL RICO "SUAVE"
agricultural workers in Mendoza. 6'
Since the Mendoza court declined to describe the source
of the plaintiffs' "legal entitlement to business relations,"162
the Diaz court adopted the logic of the Seventh Circuit in Doe
by looking to state law to determine whether Diaz's allegedly
injured interest amounted to property.1 63  Since California
law protected against intentional interference with contracts
and interference with prospective business relations, the
court held that Diaz alleged an injury to his property.' 64
Furthermore, Diaz claimed a financial injury to this property
interest in that he was unable to fulfill his employment
contract or pursue employment opportunities because he was
in jail. 65 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Diaz alleged
an injury to his property sufficient to grant him standing in a
civil RICO case.1 66
The court then turned its attention to refuting the
dissent's criticisms of its analysis. 167  Recognizing that Diaz
did not allege that he lost actual employment as a result of
his imprisonment, the court stated that such a classification
was inconsequential, as California law protected the legal
entitlement to current and prospective contractual
relations."6 s While conceding that it would have been easier
to prove causation or calculate damages for Diaz had he lost
actual employment, the court declared that such an analysis
was not relevant in determining whether he had standing to
pursue a civil RICO claim.16 9
The court also derided any notion that Diaz lacked
standing because his alleged injury was a derivative effect of
his supposed false imprisonment. 7 0  The lone standing
161. Id.
162. Id. (quoting Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1168 n.4).
163. Id. (citing Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 1992)).
164. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 900 (citing Reeves v. Hanlon, 33 Cal. 4th 1140 (2004);
Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 11 Cal. 4th 376 (1995);




167. Id. at 900-01. See infra Part II.D.3 for a discussion of the dissent in
Diaz.
168. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 900.
169. Id. at 900-01.
170. See id. at 900. While supporting the notion that Diaz had standing
under civil RICO, the court explicitly refused to comment on whether or not his
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requirement contained in § 1964(c) was that a person be
injured in his business or property "by reason of a violation of
section 1962." 17' Further, the Supreme Court clarified this
requirement in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection
Corp. 172 by holding that the words "by reason of' incorporated
a proximate cause standard into civil RICO'73 that allowed
claims arising out of the foreseeable consequences of RICO
predicate acts, such as Diaz's, to proceed. 174  While
acknowledging that this interpretation of RICO would allow
more claims to go forward, 175 the court cited Sedima's
mandate that RICO was to be interpreted broadly176 as
support for its contention that no additional standing
requirement mandated that one's injury be the direct result of
a RICO predicate act.177
2. The Concurring Opinions
Judge Reinhardt wrote a short concurring opinion in
which he expressed concern that RICO was being utilized in
ways beyond those intended by Congress. 17  In his
estimation, lawmakers did not intend to provide treble
damages for conduct unrelated to the racketeering activity
that Congress targeted by enacting RICO. 179  He urged
Congress to "take another look at RICO and consider
amending the statute so as to limit it to its original
purpose."8 0
Judge Kleinfeld concurred in the result, 81 but utilized a
different approach than the majority in his analysis. 2 He
allegations of § 1962 violations were adequate. See id. at 902. The court also
refrained from speculating on the merits of Diaz's claim. Id. at 902 n.4.
171. Id. at 901 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2005)).
172. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
173. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 901 (construing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 265-68).
174. See id. (construing Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100-01
(N.Y. 1928)).
175. Id. at 901.
176. See discussion supra Part II.B.
177. See Diaz, 420 F.3d at 901-02 ("There is . .. no room in the statutory
language for an additional, amorphous requirement that, for an injury to be to
business or property, the business or property interest have been the 'direct
target' of the predicate act.").
178. Id. at 903 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
182. Id.
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emphasized that RICO did not exclude personal injuries from
actionable civil RICO conduct because some of the predicate
acts listed in the statute were traditional personal injuries,
such as murder and kidnapping.'83 In addition, he argued
that § 1964(c) was unclear as to whether the remedy for an
injury to business applied only to those who owned a
business, or to those who sought to be employed by another."s
Thus, Judge Kleinfeld maintained that Diaz was injured in
his business, and saw no need to distinguish injury to
employment from injury to business.85
3. The Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gould argued that Diaz
did not allege an injury to business or property within the
meaning of civil RICO.18 6  He claimed that the majority's
reliance on Mendoza was misplaced because in that case, the
conduct challenged under RICO was "aimed directly at
suppressing the wages of farm workers," whereas Diaz's
alleged loss of employment was "merely an indirect and
secondary effect of a non-compensable personal injury, [his]
alleged [false] imprisonment."8 7  Diaz, Judge Gould
contended, did not allege that his false imprisonment was
directed at his business or property. 8 8  Moreover, Judge
Gould noted that Mendoza, a panel decision, did not bind the
court when it sat en banc in Diaz.8 9
Judge Gould noted that neither Oscar nor Mendoza
addressed the issue of whether an injury to business or
property sufficient for the purpose of civil RICO standing
could be derived from a non-compensable personal injury. 90
As a result, he looked to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Grogan and the Seventh Circuit's decision in Doe for
guidance. 19' He concluded that the majority's opinion created
a circuit split with the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits.' 92
183. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 904-05 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 905-06.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 907 (Gould, J., dissenting).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 911
189. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 908 (Gould, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 910.
191. Id. at 910.
192. Id. at 908.
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Judge Gould criticized the majority's "selective and incorrect"
interpretation of Doe193 because in his estimation, the
plaintiffs in Doe and Diaz both attempted to claim damages
for lost employment wages stemming from a personal
injury.9 4 Nonetheless, Judge Gould maintained, the majority
deemed Diaz's lost wages an injury to his business or
property, thereby contradicting its purported reliance on the
Doe court, which denied standing for the same injury.195
Furthermore, Judge Gould disparaged the majority's
method of distinguishing Diaz from Grogan.196 The majority
stated that Grogan did not necessarily conflict with its
decision because there, the plaintiffs may not have claimed a
right to employment that was recognized by state law as a
property interest, as Diaz did.197 Judge Gould believed that
the same critique could be made of Diaz, since his complaint
did not specify what employment he lost as a result of his
alleged false imprisonment. 198
In closing, Judge Gould stated his concern that the
majority's decision opened up the possibility for plaintiffs to
invoke RICO whenever any sort of wrong against them led to
any degree of lost employment.'99 This was undesirable, in
his opinion, because it could force courts to engage in
speculation regarding the propriety of damages.2 °0 Moreover,
he asserted that the majority's opinion unnecessarily
stretched civil RICO beyond the boundaries envisioned by
Congress because Diaz already had a remedy under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983201 for the alleged violation of his civil rights.2 2 He also
raised the notion that Diaz may not have sufficiently alleged
causation in his complaint, and criticized the majority for not
addressing this issue.20 3
193. Id. at 912.
194. Id. at 913.
195. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 913 (Gould, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 902 n.2 (majority opinion).
198. Id. at 913 (Gould, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 914.
200. See id..
201. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
202. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 914 (Gould, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 914 n.9.
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III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The split between the Ninth and the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits exemplifies a major problem with litigation
brought under civil RICO. Over the years, the judiciary has
proven incapable of applying civil RICO in a uniform
manner. °4 In particular, courts have struggled to interpret
civil RICO's standing requirements.2 5
A primary source of this inconsistency appears to be the
construction of the RICO statute. The following analysis
evaluates this problem by examining the construction of the
RICO statute and the ambiguities that lie therein,2 6 and by
considering the propriety of the differing interpretations of
civil RICO standing requirements that caused the rift
between the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits.2 °7
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Ambiguity of Civil RICO
RICO is an extremely broad piece of legislation. 20 8  Its
far-reaching structure attacks the types of activities in which
organized criminals engage, rather than maintaining a
narrow focus on affiliation with organized crime itself.2 9 In
addition, the large number of predicate acts that constitute
"racketeering activity"210 contributes to RICO's breadth. 211
Consequently, RICO provisions encompass a vast range of
conduct.212
The liberal construction clause213 augments the expansive
language of RICO. Congress' "highly unusual instruction to
interpret RICO's language liberally to effectuate its
purposes" 214 directs the judiciary to "give form to [RICO's]
204. See Kurzweil, supra note 10, at 88.
205. See Canade, supra note 93, at 1094.
206. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
207. See discussion infra Part IV.B-C.
208. See McNeil, supra note 9, at 1240.
209. See id.
210. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
211. McNeil, supra note 9, at 1242.
212. Rasmussen, supra note 24, at 626.
213. See supra text accompanying note 48.
214. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & 11, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 661, 701 (1987).
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basic ideas."21 Indeed, the Supreme Court's reliance on the
liberal construction clause in Sedima21 6 reinforced this notion
by holding that courts should refrain from limiting civil
RICO. 217
However, RICO remains a poorly defined statute.218 The
drafters went to great lengths to define such key terms as
"racketeering activity" and "enterprise" in § 1961,219 but, as
one writer noted, "it is impossible for Congress to predict all
of the issues that may arise under [a] statute."2 0 Thus, the
drafters of RICO neglected to define the terms "business" and
"property" contained in § 1964(c). 221 Accordingly, courts have
little statutory guidance within the text of RICO as to how
they are to construe these terms when determining whether a
plaintiff has standing under civil RICO.
Nevertheless, the judiciary is not entirely without
direction regarding the interpretation of the injury to
business or property requirement of civil RICO. As the
Sedima majority stated, the liberal construction clause is
particularly relevant within the context of interpreting civil
RICO, 222 as it arguably requires that any ambiguities in the
civil RICO provision "be liberally interpreted in a way that
would best effectuate the statute's remedial purposes."223 As
a result, courts adjudicating civil RICO cases should read the
injury to business or property requirement fully cognizant of
Congress' directive to do so in a broad fashion.
B. Differing Judicial Approaches to Interpreting Civil RICO
Both the Seventh and the Eleventh Circuits appear to
have strayed from the directive of the Sedima decision to
construe civil RICO broadly. 224  The Grogan221 and Doe
226
215. See Kurzweil, supra note 10, at 43.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
217. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-498 (1985) ("RICO
is to be read broadly. This is the lesson not only of Congress' self-consciously
expansive language and overall approach . . . but also of [the liberal
construction clause].").
218. See McNeil, supra note 9, at 1240.
219. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
220. Kurzweil, supra note 10, at 88.
221. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000).
222. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491 n.10.
223. Kurzweil, supra note 10, at 89.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
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decisions "strain RICO's statutory language" 227  and
ultimately fail to comply with Sedima. In Diaz, however, the
Ninth Circuit justified its expansive interpretation of civil
RICO standing requirements 228 through its express reliance
on Sedima.229
1. Doe
The Diaz majority suggested that the Doe court did not
address the question of whether the loss of the right to earn
wages could be deemed an injury to a property interest
because the Seventh Circuit did not indicate that the plaintiff
alleged the loss of such a right.23 ° However, the Doe court's
analysis reveals that the Seventh Circuit would have likely
aligned itself with Judge Gould's dissenting opinion in Diaz231
had the plaintiff raised the issue. Though the court
purported to "interpret [civil RICO] according to its plain
language,"232 the Doe opinion spoke to the confines of civil
RICO's scope as opposed to its breadth.233
The Doe court rejected the plaintiffs claims for
fraudulent inducement of sexual relations and payment of
fees inflated by said sexual relations on the grounds that
sexual labor was not a property interest under state law.234
The Diaz majority adopted this approach of consulting state
law to determine whether a specific interest amounted to a
property interest.235
However, the manner in which the Doe court dismissed
the plaintiffs claim for lost earnings exposes the rift between
225. See supra Part II.C.1.
226. See supra Part II.C.2.
227. Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kleinfeld, J.,
concurring).
228. See supra Part II.D.1.
229. See Diaz, 420 F.3d at 901.
230. Id. at 900 n.1.
231. See supra Part II.D.3.
232. Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 1992).
233. See generally id. at 767-70 (affirming the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs claim on the grounds that she did not allege an injury to business or
property within the meaning of civil RICO).
234. See id. at 767-69.
235. See Diaz, 420 F.3d at 900 ("We agree with the Seventh Circuit. Without
a harm to a specific business or property interest-a categorical inquiry
typically determined by reference to state law-there is no injury to business or
property within the meaning of RICO.").
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the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit.236 The Seventh
Circuit began its analysis by classifying civil RICO's injury to
business or property requirement as a limitation precluding
recovery for personal injuries and the resulting pecuniary
losses.237 The court designated the plaintiff's loss of wages a
personal injury, and summarily criticized the plaintiff for
"blur[ring] the distinction between proprietary and personal
injuries."238 In the court's opinion, the plaintiffs lost earnings
were a consequence of her emotional distress, reflecting
personal injuries for which civil RICO did not provide a
remedy.239
In attempting to apply civil RICO in accordance with
congressional intent,24 °  the Seventh Circuit failed to
appreciate the expansiveness of the statute. While the court
correctly observed that civil RICO was primarily intended to
lessen organized crime's influence on legitimate businesses,241
it ignored Congress' instruction to construe the statute
broadly. 242 For this reason, even if the plaintiff in Doe alleged
that her right to earn wages constituted a property interest, it
seems unlikely that the Seventh Circuit would have ruled in
her favor. The court mocked the "metaphysical speculation"
it considered necessary to view "the economic aspects of [the
plaintiffs lost wages] . . . as injuries to 'business or
property,' 243 thereby expressing a commitment to construing
RICO narrowly in contravention of the liberal construction
clause and the Sedima decision. 244 Furthermore, this
236. See Doe, 958 F.2d at 770 (holding that the plaintiffs loss of earnings did
not constitute an injury to business or property).
237. Id. at 767 (citing Rylewicz v. Beaton Services, 888 F.2d 1175, 1180 (7th
Cir. 1989)) ("The terms 'business or property' are, of course, words of limitation
which preclude recovery for personal injuries and the pecuniary losses incurred
therefrom.").
238. Id. at 770.
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 768.
242. See generally Doe, 958 F.2d at 767-70.
243. Id. at 770.
244. Compare id. at 770 ("Perhaps the economic aspects of [the plaintiffs lost
wages] could, as a theoretical matter, be viewed as injuries to 'business or
property,' but engaging in such metaphysical speculation is a task best left to
philosophers, not the federal judiciary.") with Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985) ("RICO is to be read broadly. This is the
lesson ... of Congress' self-consciously expansive language and overall approach
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methodology arguably laid the foundation for Judge Gould's
dissenting opinion in Diaz,245 demonstrating that the Seventh
Circuit would not likely concur with the Ninth Circuit's
reliance on Sedima in reaching the conclusion that the right
to earn wages is a property interest.246
2. Grogan
In Grogan, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the
flexible nature of civil RICO, 247 only to place limitations on
the application of the statute. The court cited the Supreme
Court's abolition of several restrictions on civil RICO in
Sedima 24' before misconstruing open-ended language in the
decision to justify its own restriction.249 In interpreting the
injury to business or property requirement according to its
"ordinary meaning," the court surmised that plaintiffs could
not recover for personal injuries or their resulting pecuniary
consequences under civil RICO. 250  As a result, the court
denied the plaintiffs' apparent claim for lost employment 251
because it was "most properly understood as part of a
personal injury claim."252
In the Diaz majority opinion, the Ninth Circuit remarked
that the Eleventh Circuit did not detail whether the plaintiffs
in Grogan alleged a right to employment that was recognized
as a property interest under state law, and that the two
decisions did not necessarily conflict with one another as a
result. 253  Indeed, the Grogan court left open the possibility
245. See Diaz v, Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 912-13 (9th Cir. 2005) (Gould, J.,
dissenting) ("Thus, although the majority fails to recognize it, in Doe the
Seventh Circuit addressed the same situation we face here-an allegation of
lost employment wages stemming from a non-compensable personal injury.").
246. See id. at 901-02 (majority opinion).
247. Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 845 (11th Cir. 1988).
248. Id. at 845-46.
249. The Eleventh Circuit quoted the following text from Sedima: "Any
recoverable damages occurring by reason of a violation of § 1962(c) will flow
from the commission of the predicate acts." Id. at 846 (quoting Sedima, 473
U.S. at 497). The court construed this language to mean that "some limits on
civil RICO still exist, for only recoverable damages will flow from the
commission of the predicate acts." Id.
250. Id. at 847.
251. In the Grogan opinion, the Eleventh Circuit does not reveal how the
claim for lost employment opportunities was raised. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 902 n.2
(construing Grogan, 835 F.2d 844).
252. Grogan, 835 F.2d at 848.
253. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 902 n.2.
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that a plaintiff could recover damages under civil RICO for
lost employment opportunities.254
However, the Eleventh Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit
in Doe, is more aligned with Judge Gould's dissent than with
the majority opinion in Diaz.25 Grogan's selective reliance on
Sedima ignored one of the central holdings of the Supreme
Court-that civil RICO was to be read broadly.256 The court
instead focused on methods of restricting civil RICO that
were not eliminated by Sedima.5 7 The Eleventh Circuit
stated that its decision was consistent with congressional
intent because RICO contained language restricting recovery
to those plaintiffs who could demonstrate an injury to
business or property.258  The court failed, however, to
incorporate other aspects of the congressional intent behind
civil RICO into its decision. The Eleventh Circuit did not
address the liberal construction clause in Grogan,2-9 but
rather, contradicted it by adopting a narrow interpretation of
civil RICO.
The defendants in Grogan were intertwined in a series of
extortions, robberies and attempted murders.26 °  Such
criminal activity surely embodied the type of organized crime
Congress intended to combat by enacting RICO.261 In holding
that the plaintiffs' claims were "most properly understood as
part of a personal injury claim,"262 the Eleventh Circuit's
decision directly contradicted the central purpose behind
RICO.
3. Diaz
The Diaz majority utilized a very logical methodology in
reaching its conclusion that Diaz had standing to sue under
civil RICO. The Ninth Circuit determined that Diaz's "legal
entitlement to business relations" constituted a property
254. Grogan, 835 F.2d at 848 ("We do not hold that plaintiffs may never
recover under RICO for the loss of employment opportunities.").
255. See Diaz, 420 F.3d at 902 ("The dissent's flawed approach is similar to
that of [Grogan].").
256. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985).
257. See Grogan, 835 F.2d at 845-46.
258. Id. at 846-47.
259. See generally id. at 844-48.
260. Id. at 845.
261. See supra Part II.A.
262. Grogan, 835 F.2d at 848.
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interest under state law,263 and that Diaz alleged an injury to
this property interest by virtue of his supposed false
imprisonment.2' Furthermore, since Diaz alleged that this
injury occurred "by reason of a violation of section 1962,"
there was nothing to prevent him from suing under civil
RICO.2 65 Additionally, the majority discounted the dissent's
contention that Diaz's property interest had to be the direct
target of a RICO predicate act because the Supreme Court
previously held in Holmes2 66 that the phrase "by reason of'
incorporated a proximate cause standard.2 67
The Diaz majority understood that its holding would
confer civil RICO standing on a larger number of plaintiffs
than would the dissent's model,268 but justified this result
through a strict adherence to Sedima.269 Just as the Supreme
Court prohibited the use of nebulous standing requirements
to limit the number of civil RICO claims in Sedima,27 ° the
Diaz court refused to allow the imposition of an "additional,
amorphous requirement that, for an injury to be to business
or property, the business or property interest have been the
'direct target' of the predicate act."271  The court made an
implied concession that this result may not have suited the
tastes of some, but reiterated that it was faithful to the broad
language of the statute. 272  Although Diaz did not directly
speak to the liberal construction clause,273 the Ninth Circuit
arguably upheld its mandate through its reliance on
Sedima.274
C. Why Diaz is the Correct Interpretation of Civil RICO
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Diaz's "legal
263. Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 902.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
267. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 901-02.
268. Id. at 901.
269. See id.
270. See id. at 901-02 (construing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473
U.S. 479, 499 (1985)).
271. Id. at 901.
272. See id. ("The statute is broad, but that is the statute we have.").
273. See generally Diaz, 420 F.3d at 897-903 (liberal construction clause is
not addressed).
274. See id. at 901-02 (relying on Sedima's broad interpretation of section
1964(c)).
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entitlement to business relations" constituted a property
interest 275 further demonstrates its adherence to the
congressional intent espoused by the liberal construction
clause, particularly when contrasted with the approaches of
the Doe and Grogan decisions. The Eleventh Circuit, in
Grogan, purported to effectuate the ordinary meaning of the
word "property" in § 1964(c) by requiring that plaintiffs suffer
a proprietary type of harm in the nature of damage to a
building.7 6 However, the "ordinary meaning" utilized by the
Grogan court restricted the classification of property within
the civil RICO standing provision to real property or financial
wealth, thereby excluding rights protected as intangible
property interests under state law.277 Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit in Doe refused to engage in the "metaphysical
speculation" it deemed necessary to define property as
anything but a proprietary interest.2 71
Both the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits stated that their
decisions stemmed from their desire to interpret civil RICO in
line with the congressional intent behind the statute. 7 9
However, § 1961 does not define the term "property,"280
leaving the liberal construction clause as the only expression
of congressional intent pertaining to § 1964(c).28 ' Thus,
courts should give effect to Congress' statement that RICO
should be construed liberally by interpreting civil RICO
standing requirements broadly.28 2  The Ninth Circuit's
decision in Diaz is therefore more faithful to Congress'
purpose behind civil RICO because it reflects a broad
interpretation of the statute's standing provisions rather than
275. See id. at 900.
276. Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1988).
277. See id. The Eleventh Circuit fortified its interpretation of "property" for
the purpose of civil RICO standing by referring to the dictionary definition of
the term: "[S]omething that is or may be owned or possessed: wealth, goods...
something to which a person has legal title." Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1818 (1986)).
278. See Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 1992).
279. See id. at 770 (discussing the Seventh Circuit's assertion that its
interpretation of civil RICO is in accord with congressional intent); see also
Grogan, 835 F.2d at 846-47 (discussing a similar assertion by the Eleventh
Circuit).
280. See supra text accompanying note 221.
281. See Kurzweil, supra note 10, at 88-89.
282. See id. at 89.
150 [Vol: 47
MAKING CIVIL RICO "SUAVE"
an attempt to define them narrowly. 8 3
Judge Gould's dissenting opinion in Diaz adopted the
logic of Grogan and Doe by holding that Diaz's claims
constituted non-compensable consequences of personal
injuries. 2s4 As a result, his argument is vulnerable to the
same criticisms that apply to the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuit's decisions. 285
Nevertheless, this does not obscure the fact that Judge
Gould raised valid concerns about the use of civil RICO in his
dissenting opinion.286 Judge Gould voiced his alarm at the
prospect of plaintiffs lawyers "savvy enough to include an
allegation that other wrongs lead to any degree of lost
employment," 287 echoing the unease of critics who charge that
civil RICO leads to theory shopping. 8 8  In addition, his
contention that granting Diaz standing under RICO displaced
an existing remedy for the alleged violation of his civil
rights2 9 captured the sentiments of those who claim that civil
RICO actions violate principles of federalism.290
Judge Gould and other critics of civil RICO argue that
the statute is prone to abuse, and that it is being utilized in
ways not envisioned by Congress.291 Indeed, plaintiffs have
utilized civil RICO to combat more than just organized
292crime. However, the expansion of RICO into areas beyond
organized crime has been facilitated through adherence to the
language of the statute.293 Though the statute was designed
283. See Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 901-902 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam),
for the Ninth Circuit's justification of its broad interpretation of civil RICO.
Incidentally, University of Notre Dame Professor Robert G. Blakely, the drafter
of the original RICO statute, believes that the Ninth Circuit decided Diaz
correctly. Pamela A. MacLean, Civil RICO Keeps Marching On: Circuits See
Narrow Use, Justices Broad, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 12, 2005, at 1.
284. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 921 (Gould, J., dissenting).
285. See supra Part IV.B-C.
286. See Diaz, 420 F.3d at 913-14 (Gould, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 914.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 80-87.
289. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 914 (Gould, J., dissenting).
290. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 3, at 747; Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 501 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
291. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70; see also supra Part II.D.3.
292. See Hughes, supra note 66, at 644-45 (quoting William Rehnquist,
Reforming Diversity Jurisdiction and Civil RICO, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 5, 9
(1989)) ("Most of the civil suits filed under [§ 1964(c)] have nothing to do with
organized crime. They are garden-variety civil fraud cases of the type
traditionally litigated in state courts.").
293. See Lynch, supra note 26, at 774-75 ("It is simply wrong to blame the
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to fight organized crime, its language is sufficiently
ambiguous to enable plaintiffs to pursue damages from
entities and persons not affiliated with criminal
enterprises.294 The liberal construction clause295 supports the
wide reach of the statute as well. Thus, courts should
embrace a broad reading of civil RICO unless and until
Congress chooses to restrict the scope of the statute via the
legislative process."
V. PROPOSAL
Courts have failed to consistently apply the provisions of
RICO in compliance with congressional directives.297  A
central reason for this irregularity is RICO's ambiguity,
which is enhanced by the liberal construction clause.298 In
effect, RICO demonstrates that Congress must provide courts
with clear criteria for interpreting the laws it passes in order
to achieve uniform results within the judiciary.2 99
Though § 1961 defines many of the terms central to
RICO's construction, the statute does not provide the same
level of specificity regarding terms contained in the civil
RICO provision. 00 Thus, courts are left with the unenviable
task of attempting to effectuate the congressional intent
behind civil RICO without the benefit of its precise
expression. This comment proposes that Congress implement
the following amendments to § 1961 of RICO to eliminate the
vagueness engulfing civil RICO standing requirements and to
ensure that courts uniformly interpret the statute's
provisions in line with congressional intent.
A. Amend § 1961 by Defining "Property"
Congress should amend § 1961 of RICO by inserting a
definition for the term "property" contained within the civil
courts or the Justice Department for expanding RICO. Congress took care of
that itself. The expansion of RICO into white-collar crimes, political corruption,
and illicit enterprises is simply the result of straightforward application of the
language chosen by Congress.").
294. See McNeil, supra note 9, at 1241.
295. See supra text accompanying note 48.
296. See Kurzweil, supra note 10, at 89.
297. Id. at 88.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See supra Part IV.A.
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RICO provision. The lack of a definition renders the term
amorphous, 30 1 leaving open the possibility for courts to
promulgate differing interpretations of it. As a result, the
Ninth Circuit held that "property" under civil RICO
encompassed intangible property interests,3 2 while the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits rejected such a notion in Doe
and Grogan, respectively. 30 3
Congress can prevent future ambiguity by defining
"property" as it pertains to civil RICO standing. The liberal
construction clause is the only expression of congressional
intent that the judiciary may rely on,30a indicating that
Congress intended for the courts to interpret RICO broadly.
Hence, Congress should incorporate a broad definition of
"property" into § 1961 that encompasses both proprietary and
nonpossessory property interests, such as Diaz's legal
entitlement to business relations,3 5 into the statute. On the
contrary, if Congress wishes for courts to implement an
interpretation of the term similar to the Eleventh Circuit's
analogy of damage to a building,30 6 it should amend § 1961 to
include a definition that restricts "property" to real property
and financial assets. The former proposal would likely
increase the number of civil RICO claims. The latter
proposal, however, would induce an increased number of
dismissals for lack of standing and likely reduce the number
of civil RICO suits initiated. In either case, the judiciary
would benefit from a clear directive outlining Congress'
intent.
B. Amend § 1961 by Defining "Business"
The term "business," as it pertains to the civil RICO
standing requirements, is not defined by § 1961.307 Thus,
there exists the potential for a split amongst the circuits
regarding the meaning of this term similar to the current
divide over the definition of the term "property." In his
concurring opinion in Diaz, Judge Kleinfeld noted the
301. See Kurzweil, supra note 10, at 76.
302. See supra Part IID. 1.
303. See supra Part II.C.1-2.
304. See supra Part V.A.
305. See Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
306. See Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 847 (l1th Cir. 1988).
307. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000).
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ambiguity inherent in the word "business" by stating that it
was unclear whether Congress intended to restrict the
availability of civil RICO remedies for injuries to businesses
owned by sole proprietors. °8
In order to prevent a future circuit split, Congress should
amend § 1961 of RICO by defining "business" as it applies to
the civil RICO standing requirements. In order to effectuate
a broad interpretation of the term consistent with the liberal
construction clause, 0 Congress should specify that "business"
encompasses employees as well as business owners. This
approach, however, must be undertaken with caution. In his
dissenting opinion in Diaz, Judge Gould attacked what he
viewed as the majority's hypocrisy in granting Diaz standing
under civil RICO when it was not clear that Diaz was
employed at all.3 10 Judge Gould's declaration highlights the
possibility of courts denying standing to civil RICO litigants
alleging an injury to business on the basis that they are
unemployed. Therefore, Congress must also define "business"
in a manner that clearly delineates whether civil RICO
standing under the injury to business provision is reserved
for those persons able to demonstrate an injury to their
existing employment.
Conversely, if Congress wishes to preclude those who do
not own businesses from filing civil RICO lawsuits, any
amendment should unambiguously restrict the definition of
the term to the ownership stakes of proprietors. In effect,
such an amendment would restrict relief under RICO to a
smaller class of plaintiffs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In January 2006, the United States Supreme Court
denied the City of Los Angeles' appeal of the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Diaz."' In effect, the Court asserted that
Congress, not the judiciary, was best situated to correct any
issues with civil RICO. 12
308. See id. at 905-06 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) ("I cannot see what purpose
Congress could have intended to serve by limiting 'person injured in his
business' to some forms of earning a living but not others.").
309. See supra Part IV.A.
310. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 913 (Gould, J., dissenting).
311. Parks v. Diaz, 126 S. Ct. 1069 (2006).
312. See supra Part II.B.
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However, even if the Court granted certiorari in Diaz,
civil RICO would have remained a problematic issue for the
judiciary. This comment's approach of examining RICO313
and the conflicting interpretations of its civil remedy
provision 314 exposed RICO's construction as the root cause of
judicial dissension.1 5 In analyzing the ambiguous nature of
civil RICO 316 and evaluating the Doe,317 Grogan,31 ' and Diaz
319
decisions, this comment demonstrated that the Ninth Circuit
faithfully effectuated the purposes of the statute320 and that
the legislative process is the proper means by which to
address concerns about civil RICO's use and scope. 21
Moreover, it proposed that Congress clarify its intent behind
civil RICO by amending the statute.2 2
The judicial branch can not correct civil RICO's inherent
imperfections, and therefore, Congress must step in to
remedy the situation. 23 Sustained congressional inaction
ensures perpetual confusion within the judiciary and
increases the potential for courts to continue to interpret the
statute's provisions incorrectly.
313. See supra Part II.A.
314. See supra Part II.B-D.
315. See supra Part III.
316. See supra Part N.A.
317. See supra Part IV.B.1.
318. See supra Part IV.B.2.
319. See supra Part IV.B.3.
320. See supra Part IV.C.
321. See supra Part IV.C.
322. See supra Part V.A-B.
323. Getzendanner, supra note 61, at 678.
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